Many emerging applications in both wired and wireless networks need support of secure group communications. There have been many secure group communication schemes in the setting of wired networks.
Introduction
Secure group communications are useful in both wired and wireless networks. One important property of secure group communications is the assurance that only the legitimate members (or users, receivers) can have access to the multicast or broadcast data. There have been many secure group communication schemes in the setting of wired networks; popular ones include the stateful LKH [28, 27] and OFT [25, 2] as well as the stateless [22, 12] . These schemes can be directly adopted in, or appropriately adapted to, the setting of wireless networks such as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and sensor networks. (a) initial key tree Further, k 1−8 is securely erased by u 1 , . . . , u 8 , and k 78 is securely erased by u 7 and u 8 .
Now suppose u 8 leaves. To prevent u 8 from accessing future communications, as shown in Figure 1 .(c),
server s needs to change k 1−9 and k 789 to k 1−7,9 and k 7,9 , respectively. Moreover, the new group key k 1−7,9
needs to be securely sent to users u 1 , . . . , u 7 , u 9 , and k 7,9 needs to be securely sent to u 7 and u 9 . One efficient way to do this is the following algorithm (which also corresponds to the group-oriented rekeying strategy):
s → {u 1 , . . . , u 7 , u 9 } : {k 1−7,9 } k123 , {k 1−7,9 } k456 , {k 1−7,9 } k7, 9 , {k 7,9 } k7 , {k 7,9 } k9 Further, k 1−9 is securely erased by u 1 , . . . , u 7 , u 9 , and k 789 is securely erased by u 7 and u 9 . Now suppose u 6 leaves. To prevent u 6 from accessing future communications, as shown in Figure 1 .
(d),
server s needs to change k 1−7,9 and k 456 to k 1−5,7,9 and k 45 , respectively. Moreover, the new group key k 1−5,7,9 needs to be securely sent to users u 1 , . . . , u 5 , u 7 , u 9 , and k 45 needs to be securely sent to users u 4 and u 5 . One efficient way to do this is the following algorithm (which also corresponds to the group-oriented rekeying strategy):
s → {u 1 , . . . , u 5 , u 7 , u 9 } : {k 1−5,7,9 } k123 , {k 1−5,7,9 } k45 , {k 1−5,7,9 } k7, 9 , {k 45 } k4 , {k 45 } k5
Further, k 1−7,9 is securely erased by u 1 , . . . , u 5 , u 7 , u 9 , and k 456 is securely erased by u 4 and u 5 . Now, let's examine the consequences that a legitimate user is compromised.
• Suppose an adversary compromises user u 9 . It is of course true that the adversary is able to obtain the present group key k 1−5,7,9 , no matter how the group rekeying scheme works. Moreover, the adversary can obtain k 7,9 and k 9 . We observe that the adversary who has recorded the network traffic is also able to obtain the past group keys k 1−9 and k 1−7,9 , because it can decrypt the messages incurred by the events that u 9 joins the group and that u 8 leaves the group:
s → {u 9 } : {k 1−9 , k 789 } k9 , s → {u 1 , . . . , u 7 , u 9 } : {k 1−7,9 } k123 , {k 1−7,9 } k456 , {k 1−7,9 } k7,9 , {k 7,9 } k7 , {k 7,9 } k9 .
We stress that this is true even though the past group keys k 1, 9 and k 1−7,9 were securely erased by u 9 .
As a consequence, the adversary can decrypt the communications encrypted using the past and present group keys k 1−9 , k 1−7,9 , and k 1−5,7,9 . We notice that the initial group key k 1−8 is never accessible to u 9 .
• Suppose an adversary compromises user u 7 . Then, the adversary knows k 1−5,7,9 , k 7, 9 , and k 7 . Note that the adversary can obtain k 1−7,9 from the recorded traffic corresponding to the event that u 8 leaves the group:
s → {u 1 , . . . , u 7 , u 9 } : {k 1−7,9 } k123 , {k 1−7,9 } k456 , {k 1−7,9 } k7, 9 , {k 7,9 } k7 , {k 7,9 } k9 .
We stress that this is true even though the past group key k 1−7,9 was securely erased by u 7 . We notice that the above analysis is based on the implicit assumption that the initial group key k 1−8 was "magically" sent to u 7 . In practice, k 1−8 might have been sent to u 7 via its individual key k 7 . This means that the adversary can obtain k 1−8 , and thus k 1−9 through the recorded traffic corresponding to the event that u 9 joins the group: As a consequence, all past and present group keys, namely k 1−8 , k 1−9 , k 1−7,9 and k 1−5,7,9 , are compromised even if the first three were securely erased by u 7 .
• Suppose u 5 is compromised. Then, the adversary knows k 1−5,7,9 , k 45 , and k 5 . Further, if k 1−8 was sent to u 5 through an encryption using its individual key k 5 , then k 1−8 is exposed. Moreover, k 1−9 can be obtained by the adversary from the recorded traffic corresponding to the event that u 9 joins the group: As a consequence, the past and present group keys, namely k 1−8 , k 1−9 and k 1−5,7,9 are compromised, even if they were securely erased by u 5 .
A similar analysis applies to the case that u 4 is compromised.
• Suppose u 1 is compromised. Then k 1−5,7,9 , k 123 , and k 1 are obtained by the adversary. This means that the adversary can further obtain k 1−7,9 from the recorded traffic corresponding to the event that u 8 leaves the group:
s → {u 1 , . . . , u 7 , u 9 } : {k 1−7,9 } k123 , {k 1−7,9 } k456 , {k 1−7,9 } k7,9 , {k 7,9 } k7 , {k 7,9 } k9 .
Further, the above analysis is based on the implicit assumption that the initial group key k 1−8 was "magically" sent to u 1 . In practice, k 1−8 might have been sent to u 1 via its individual key k 1 . This means that the adversary can obtain k 1−8 , and thus k 1−9 through the recorded traffic corresponding to the event that u 9 joins the group: As a consequence, all past and present group keys, namely k 1−8 , k 1−9 , k 1−7,9 and k 1−5,7,9 , are compromised even if the first three were securely erased by u 1 .
A similar analysis applies to the case that u 2 or u 3 is compromised.
In summary, the above analysis shows, in sharp contrast to the desired property that the adversary can only obtain the present group key k 1−5, 7, 9 , that compromising any of u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 7 could lead to the exposure of all past and present group keys, and compromising any of u 4 , u 5 , u 9 leads to the exposure of most past and present group keys. This means that the adversary has much flexibility in selecting the weakest node to compromise. Finally, we remark that the attack is not fundamentally related to the group-oriented rekeying strategy, and that the LKH+ [26] , which was seemingly motivated from an efficiency perspective, resolves only piece of the problem because the above attack remains effective when the group dynamics are incurred by leaving events.
Vulnerability of the One-way Function Tree (OFT) scheme:
The OFT [25, 2] is a stateful group communication scheme. The basic idea underlying the OFT scheme is the following. The center maintains a binary tree, each node x of which is associated with two cryptographic keys: a node key k x and a blinded node key k x = g(k x ), where g is an appropriate one-way function. Every leaf of the tree is associated with a group member, and the center assigns a randomly chosen key k x to each member x. Let f be a "mixing"
function (e.g., ⊕). The interior node keys are defined by the rule
where lef t(u) and right(u) are the left and right children of the node u, respectively. This way, the node key associated with the root of the tree is the group key. In order for a member u to derive the group key, the center (or server, sender) sends the blinded node keys of nodes adjacent to the nodes on (i.e., of the nodes "hanging" off) the path from u to the root.
When a new member joins the group, an existing leaf node u is split, the member associated with u is now associated with lef t(u), and the new member is associated with right(u). Both members are given new keys. The new blinded node keys that have been changed are securely sent to the appropriate subgroups of members.
When the member associated with a node u is evicted from the group, the member assigned to the sibling of u is reassigned to the parent p of u and given a new leaf key. If the sibling s of u is the root of a subtree, then p becomes s, moving the subtree closer to the root, and one of the leaves of this subtree is given a new key. The new blinded node keys are securely sent to the appropriate subgroups of members.
Now we show why the OFT scheme is also vulnerable to a similar attack. The key observation is that whenever there is a change to any blinded node key, the center needs to securely send the new blinded node keys to certain other legitimate nodes. It seems that any reasonable method would be based on the keys possessed by the respective nodes (e.g., u). Since u can derive the new group key after receiving the rekeying message, an outsider adversary could use the following strategy to recover the group key: it first records the rekeying message, and then breaks into u's computer after the next rekeying event (assuming that u is still legitimate). Moreover, compromising any of the nodes that have not been evicted enables the adversary to recover past and present group keys.
Vulnerability of the stateless subset-cover framework: Naor et al. [22] presented the first practical stateless group communication scheme, which has its roots in broadcast encryption [9] . Compared with the stateful group communication schemes discussed above, stateless schemes have the nice feature that they do not assume the receivers (or users, members) being always on-line. Since the receivers do not necessarily update their state from session to session, stateless schemes are especially good for applications over lossy channels (e.g., MANETs and sensor networks).
Initialization: Every receiver u is assigned private information I u . For all 1 ≤ i ≤ w such that u ∈ S i , I u allows u to deduce the key L i corresponding to the set S i .
Broadcasting: Given a set R of revoked receivers, the center (or server, group controller, sender) executes the following:
1. Choose a session encryption key K.
Find a partition of the users in
. . , L im be the keys associated with the above subsets.
. . , L im and sends the ciphertext
Decryption: A receiver u, upon receiving a broadcast message [i 1 , . . . , i m , C 1 , . . . , C m ], C , executes as follows.
1. Find i j such that u ∈ S ij (in the case u ∈ R the result is null).
Extract the corresponding key
3. Decrypt C j using key L ij to obtain K.
4. Decrypt C using key K to obtain the message M . The subset-cover framework of [22] is reviewed in Fig. 2 , where N is the set of all users, R ⊂ N is a group of |R| = r users whose decryption privileges should be revoked, E L and F K are two appropriate symmetric key cryptosystems (whose properties will be specified later). The goal of a stateless group communication scheme is to allow a center to transmit a message M to all users such that any user u ∈ N \ R can decrypt the message correctly, while even a coalition consisting of all members of R cannot decrypt it. Suppose S 1 , . . . , S w are a collection of subsets of users, where S j ⊆ N for 1 ≤ j ≤ w, and each S j is assigned a long-lived key L j such that each u ∈ S j should be able to deduce L j from its secret information I u . Given a
then a session key K can be encrypted m times with L i1 , . . . , L im , and each user u ∈ N \ R can obtain K and thus M .
The subset-cover framework has a vulnerability similar to the one against the stateful group schemes.
Specifically, suppose an adversary A / ∈ N records all the encrypted communications over the channels. If A breaks into a legitimate user u ∈ N at a later point of time, then A obtains I u , which allows it to recover the L ij (and thus the encrypted M ) that u was entitled to obtain. In the extreme case that u has never been revoked, A can recover all past and present keys.
Our Contributions
We trace the above vulnerability of group communication schemes back to that their security models (if any)
are not sufficient. We formalize two adversarial models. One is called the passive attack model, in which the adversary is passive in the sense that it is only allowed to join and leave the group in an arbitrary fashion, but not allowed to corrupt any legitimate members. This model has seemingly been implicitly adopted in the existing group communication literature. The other more realistic one is called the active outsider attack model, in which the adversary is further allowed to corrupt legitimate members. This model helps understand and deal with the aforementioned attack. In each of the two models, we define two security notions, namely
forward-security meaning that the revoked or evicted members, even if they collude, cannot obtain the future group keys, and backward-security meaning that a newly admitted member cannot obtain the past group keys. 1 This allows us to obtain the following interesting results about the relationships between these security notions, which are equally applicable to both stateful and stateless group communication schemes (see Sections 3.3 and 6.2, respectively).
1. In the active outsider attack model, backward-security (also called strong-security) is strictly stronger than forward-security (also called security). This means that in the active outsider attack model one only needs to prove the backward-security property.
2. In the passive attack model, backward-security is equivalent to forward-security.
3. Backward-security in the active outsider attack model (i.e., strong-security) is strictly stronger than backward-security in the passive attack model. However, we do not know whether forward-security in active outsider attack model is also strictly stronger than its counterpart in the passive attack model (we only know that when the adversary is static they are equivalent).
4. The security achieved in existing group communication schemes (e.g., [28, 25, 22, 12] ) is indeed, as we will show, forward-security in the active outsider attack model (i.e., security). This has become clear only until now because there were no formal models specified before (in spite of the fact that the passive attack model has seemingly been implicitly adopted in the literature). The achieved security property is at least as strong as what we call backward-security in the passive attack model, but strictly weaker than what we call backward-security in the active outsider attack model (i.e., strong-security) -a property that dismisses the attack discussed above.
Besides the above general results, we show that some practical methods can transform a subclass of the group communication schemes (including LKH [28, 27] , LKH+ [26] , and the complete subtree method [22] ) into ones that achieve the desired strong-security. The methods are based on two general compilers. The extra complexity imposed by the compilers is typically that at each rekeying event a group member conducts logarithmically-many pseudorandom function evaluations. This should not jeopardize their utility even in the setting of MANETs and sensor networks, as pseudorandom functions may be implemented with block ciphers in practice. We also present instantiations of the compilers, which lead to concrete schemes that achieve the desired strong-security.
Although the technical means underlying the transformation is to evolve the keys based on a secure pseudorandom function family -an idea inspired by [4] , there are some subtle issues in our settings. First, we must allow the adversary to corrupt some group keys that are used to encrypt the communications before the rekeying message of interest. Of course, the corrupt members must have been revoked before that rekeying message. On the other hand, in [4] no such corruption is allowed before the event of interest. Second, from an adversary's perspective of view, there could be many "valuable" users in our settings, meaning that an adversary only needs to compromise the weakest one of them. Whereas, no such flexibility is given to the adversary in the setting of [4] . [4, 7] .
Remark 1

Related Work
The WGL scheme was independently invented in [27] . Both schemes are sometimes called Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH). Although these schemes are mainly invented for secure multicast applications, we believe that many other applications can utilize such a scheme; we refer the reader to [23, 6] for a survey, including the relationship between the schemes of [28, 27] and the schemes of [9, 22] . We notice that the stateless schemes (e.g., [22, 12] ) are perhaps more useful in an environment of lossy channels. Although the LKH scheme has been extended in several directions, these extensions are motivated to improve performance rather than to achieve strictly stronger security. For example, performance can be improved by periodic group rekeying [24] or batch rekeying [19] , and improved trade-offs between storage and communication are available in [8, 6, 21] . Nevertheless, these techniques may also be utilized in our strongly-secure group communication schemes. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first one that identifies a new and realistic attack, and presents solutions to (a subclass of) the popular group communication schemes. The variant presented in [26] (which is also known as LKH+) is similar to our performance optimization that the communication complexity incurred by joining events can be substantially reduced. However, there was no formal treatment of the utilized key evolvement, nor was their scheme resistant against the attack introduced in Section 1.1.
While secure group-oriented communications have been extensively investigated in the setting of wired networks, their counterparts in the setting of wireless networks have yet to be thoroughly explored. Although the aforementioned schemes can be directly deployed in wireless settings, a simple-minded adoption may not lead to the desired performance (see, e.g., [30, 17] ). Fortunately, there have been some interesting investigations that show that these schemes can be adapted (e.g., by taking into account some physical characteristics of ad hoc networks [18, 16, 15, 17] ) so that better performance can be achieved. One of the practical values of the present paper is that the significantly improved security guarantee in the popular group communication schemes can be seamlessly integrated into the methods for improving performance [18, 16, 15, 17] . Indeed, our schemes can be easily integrated into any other methods for improving performance to achieve better security, as long as the methods assume "black-box" access to an underlying security group communication scheme. There have been few other attempts at securing group communications in such settings: [14] presented a scheme for secure multicast communications in MANETs based on public key cryptosystems; [30] investigated a different approach to secure group communications.
Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review some cryptographic preliminaries.
In Section 3 we present formal models and security definitions of stateful group communication schemes, as well as the relationships between the security notions. In Section 4 we present a compiler for stateful group communication schemes and investigate its properties. The compiler is utilized in Section 5 to derive a concrete strongly-secure stateful group communication scheme out of the secure WGL scheme, which is reviewed in Appendix A for completeness. In Section 6 we explore stateless group communication schemes in parallel to their stateful counterparts. We conclude the paper in Section 7.
Cryptographic Preliminaries
A function :
We will base security of group communication schemes on the security of pseudorandom function families. A pseudorandom function (PRF) family {f k } parameterized by a secret value k ∈ R {0, 1} κ has the following property [10] : A probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A has only a negligible (in κ) advantage in distinguishing f k from a perfect random function (with the same domain and range). It is well-known that pseudorandom functions can be naturally used to construct symmetric key encryption schemes that are secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (which suffices our treatment of the WGL scheme). Informally, this means that no adversary is able to learn any significant information about the encrypted content. We refer the reader to [13] for a thorough treatment on this subject. 
Model and Definition of Stateful Secure Group Communications
In Section 3.1 we present a formal security model for stateful (and symmetric key cryptography based) group communications. In Section 3.2 we specify the adversarial models and desired security properties. In Section 3.3 we explore the relationships between the security notions.
Model
Let κ be a security parameter, and ID be the set of possible group members (i.e., users, receivers, or principals)
such that |ID| is polynomially-bounded in κ. There is a special entity called a Group Controller (i.e., key server, center, server, or sender), denoted by GC, such that GC / ∈ ID.
Since a stateful group communication scheme is driven by "rekeying" events (because of joining or leaving operations below), it is convenient to treat the events occur at "virtual time" t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., because the group controller is able to maintain such an execution history. This indeed accommodates the following important two cases: (1) all the parties periodically update their keys, even if there are no joining or leaving operations -this is relevant when a scheme achieves what we call strong-security specified below; (2) the lengths of the time periods do not have to be the same -this is the case when the rekeying events occur in an arbitrary fashion. At time t, let ∆ (t) denote the set of legitimate group members,
GC the set of keys held by GC,
U the state indicating whether U ∈ ∆ (t) has successfully received the rekeying message. Initially, ∀ U ∈ ID, t ∈ N, set acc
U ← false. We assume that GC treat joining and leaving operation separately (e.g., first fulfilling the leaving operation and then immediately the joining one), even if the requests are made simultaneously. This strategy has indeed been adopted in the group communication literature.
To simplify the presentation, we assume that during the system initialization (i.e., Setup below) or the admission of a joining user, GC can communicate with each legitimate member U ∈ ID through an authenticated private channel, and that after the system initialization GC can communicate with any U through an authenticated channel. We notice that authenticated channels can by implemented by a digital signature scheme [28] , and digital signatures are sometimes necessary [5] . We also notice that, in practice, authenticated private channels can be based on two-party authenticated key-exchange protocols. However, we stress that the key, which may be called key-encryption-key, for fulfilling secure transmission of what may be
Ui below) should be securely erased after the system initialization.
Without loss of any generality, suppose k is the common key established using a two-party key-exchange protocol. If the group-communication-keys are information-theoretically independent of k, then k can be directly used as the key-encryption-key and is securely erased after secure transmission of them. Otherwise, f k (0) may serve as the key-encryption-key, and k is substituted with f k (1) and f k (0) is securely erased after the transmission of them. We remark that this subtle and important issue is not addressed in the group communication literature.
Although we will not make any synchronization assumption about the underlying communication model, which could therefore be asynchronous [20] . However, known practical schemes (e.g., [28, 27, 8] ) assume reliable delivery, which would require some (loose) clock synchronization.
A group communication scheme has the following components:
Setup: The group controller GC generates a set of keys K (0) GC , and distributes them to the present group members (that may be determined by the adversary), ∆ (0) ⊆ ID, through the authenticated private channels. (In the case that some users were corrupted before this setup procedure, we may let the adversary select the keys held by the corrupt users.) Each member U i ∈ ∆ (0) holds a set of keys
GC , and there is a key, k (0) that is common to all the present members, namely
Join: This algorithm is executed by group controller GC at time, say, t due to some join request(s) (we abstract away the out-of-band authentication and establishment of an individual key for each of the new members). It takes as input: (1) identities of previous group members, ∆ (t−1) , (2) identities of newly admitted group members, ∆ ⊆ ID \ ∆ (t−1) , (3) keys held by the group controller,
, and (4) keys held by group members, {K
It outputs updated system state information, including: (1) identities of new group members, ∆ (t) ←
GC , (3) new keys for new group members, {K (t)
Ui } Ui∈∆ (t) , which are somehow sent to the legitimate users through the authenticated channels (depending on concrete schemes), (4) new group key
Leave: This algorithm is executed by the group controller GC at time, say, t due to leave or revocation operation(s). It takes as input: (1) 
GC , (3) new keys for new group members, {K
are somehow sent to the legitimate users through the authenticated channels (depending on concrete
Rekey: This algorithm is executed by the legitimate group members at some time t, namely all
where ∆ (t) is derived from a Join or Leave event. In other words, U i ∈ ∆ (t) runs this algorithm upon receiving the message from GC over the authenticated channel. The algorithm takes as input the received message and U i 's secrets, and is supposed to output the updated keys for the group member.
If the execution of the algorithm is successful, U i sets: (1) acc
Ui , where k
is supposed to be the new group key.
If the rekeying event is incurred by a Join event, every
and any temporary storage after obtaining K
Ui . If the rekeying event is incurred by a Leave event, every U i ∈ ∆ (t) erases
Ui , and every honest leaving group member
(although a corrupt one does not have to follow this protocol).
We require that any group communication scheme satisfy the following correctness: for any t = 1, 2, . . .
GC .
Security Definitions
We consider an adversary that has complete control over all the communications in the network. To simplify the definition, we assume that the group controller is never compromised; this is not necessarily a restriction because the adversary could have compromised all the group members (and thus have obtained the secrets the group controller holds).
An adversary's interaction with principals in the network is modeled by allowing it to have access to (some of) the following oracles:
• O Send (U, t, M, action): Send a message M to U ∈ {GC} ∪ ID at time t ≥ 0, and output its reply, where action ∈ {Setup, Join, Leave, Rekey} meaning that U will execute according to the corresponding protocol, and M specifies the needed information for executing the protocol. Of course, the query of type Setup is only made at time t = 0.
• O Reveal (U, t): Output group key held by U ∈ ∆ (t) at time t, namely k
• O Corrupt (U, t): Output the keys held by
• O T est (U, t): This oracle may be queried only once, at any time during the adversary's execution. A random bit b is generated: if b = 1 the adversary is given k
U where U ∈ ∆ (t) , and if b = 0 the adversary is given a random key of length |k
Now we define the active outside attack model that is strictly more powerful than the passive outsider attack model that has been implicitly utilized in the literature. 
Definition 3.2 (passive attack model) In this model, the adversary is only allowed to make O Send (·, ·, ·, ·) and O T est (·, ·) queries. In other words, the adversary is only allowed to join and leave the group (in an arbitrary fashion though).
In each of the two models, we define two security notions: backward-security and forward-security. That is, we have four security notions: forward-security in the active outsider attack model or simply security, backward-security in the active outsider attack model or simply strong-security, forward-security in the active outsider attack model, and backward-security in the passive attack model. 
Definition 3.4 (strong-security) Intuitively, it means that an adversary learns no information about a group key if, with respect to the rekeying event of interest there is no corrupt legitimate member (this implicitly implies that all the previously corrupt members have been revoked). Formally, consider the following event
Succ:
(1)-(3) The same as in the definition of security. 
On the Relationships between the Security Notions
We summarize the relationships between the security notions of stateful group communication schemes in Proof. This is almost immediate because, on one hand, the definition of strong-security ensures the secrecy Proof. The fact that security does not imply strong-security is implied by Theorem 5.1, which states that the WGL scheme is secure, and that the WGL scheme is insecure against an active outsider attacker (cf. the attack scenario in Section 1.1). 2
The above proposition implies that for a stateful group communication scheme, one only needs to show that it is strongly-secure. with a non-negligible probability. This also means that, with respect to the leaving event at time t 2 , A can distinguish k (t) from a random string for some t ≥ t 2 with a non-negligible probability. Since A does not make any O Reveal or O corrupt query, the scheme is not forward-secure in the passive attack model. 2
We do not know whether forward-security in the passive attack mode also implies forward-security in the active outsider attack model. The relationship may seem trivial at a first glance, since all the corrupt members are revoked before the "challenge" session, and the adversary is not allowed to corrupt any member after the "challenge" session. Although it can indeed be showed that the implication holds, provided that the adversary is static meaning that the adversary decides which principals in ID it will corrupt at system initialization. In the more interesting case that the adversary is adaptive, we do not know how to prove it. Proof. Theorem 5.1 shows that the WGL scheme is secure (i.e., forward-secure in the active outsider attack model), which trivially means that it is also forward-secure in the passive attack model. Then, Proposition 3.3 shows that it is also backward-secure in the passive attack model.
On the other hand, the attack scenario showed in Section 1.1 states that the WGL scheme is not backwardsecure in the active outsider attack model. 2
A Compiler for Stateful Group Communication Schemes
Suppose {f k } is a secure pseudorandom function family. Now we present a compiler that transforms a secure group communication scheme, SGC = (Setup, Join, Leave, Rekey), into a strongly-secure one, SSGC = (Setup * , Join * , Leave * , Rekey * ). The compiler applies to the subclass of stateful group communication schemes
where the different keys belong to K
are computationally independent of each other, where t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. In what follows "a key k needs to be changed" means that it should be substituted with a random key that is information-theoretically independent of k. 
} is used as an encryption key in SGC.Join, let f ki (0) play the role of k i .
Every individual key
Leave * : This algorithm is executed by GC at time, say, t. Let K be the set of keys that need to be changed (including the group key k (t−1) ) or eliminated, and K * * be the new keys (including the new group key k (t) ) that are used to replace (possibly a subset of) the keys in K.
1. Execute SGC.Leave except for the following: (1) let f ki (0) play the role of the corresponding key
} is used as an encryption key in SGC.Leave, let f ki (0) play the role of k i .
Rekey * : There are two cases.
• The rekeying event is incurred by a Leave event at time t. In this case, every honest leaving user should erase all the secrets as in SGC.Rekey, and every remaining user, V ∈ ∆ (t) , executes the following. Denote by
the subset of keys that need to be changed to a set of new keys
(We notice that both K V and K V can be derived by V after receiving the rekeying message and that k (t) ∈ K V .) First, V executes SGC.Rekey except for letting f ki (0) play the role of k i under the circumstance that
} is used as an encryption key, and updates every
V ) as in SGC.Rekey.
• The rekeying event is incurred by a Join event at time t. We notice that user V ∈ ∆ (t) holds a 
erases the outdated keys (other than K (t) V ) as in SGC.Rekey.
Analysis
First we analyze the complexity of SSGC.
• • It does not introduce any extra storage complexity over SGC, provided that the temporary storage for the keys such as f ki (0) is insignificant. This is at least true for most applications including MANETs and sensor networks.
• The only extra complexity of SSGC over SGC is the evaluation of the pseudorandom functions. Specifically, the server needs to conduct O(max{|K
GC |}) pseudorandom function evaluation operations; a user V needs to conduct O(max{|K
U |}) pseudorandom function operations. We notice that typically |K
GC |)) (e.g., [28] ). This should be insignificant for most applications including MANETs and sensor networks. Now we prove that SSGC is indeed strongly-secure.
Theorem 4.1 Assume {f k } is a secure pseudorandom function family (as specified in Section 2). If SGC is
secure, then SSGC is strongly-secure.
Proof. (sketch)
We show that if SSGC is not strongly-secure, then SGC is not secure. Note that the key difference between the two security notions is whether the adversary is allowed to corrupt a legitimate user after the rekeying event of interest. Note also that after a rekeying event in SSGC all the new keys are either information-theoretically or computationally independent of each other.
First, consider a mental scheme that is the same as in SSGC except that the keys of the form f ki (0) are always substituted with freshly and independently chosen random keys, where k i is not held by any corrupt user. We claim that this mental scheme achieves strong-security; otherwise, there is an efficient algorithm to break the security of SGC. To see this, we construct a simulator that has access to a challenge SGC environment. Since the number of rekeying events in SSGC is polynomially-bounded, the simulator has an inversion polynomial probability in successfully guessing the rekeying event of interest -the event corresponding to the O T est (·, ·) query.
1. The simulator interacts with the adversary as in SSGC; this can be done because the simulator has complete control over the keys utilized in the SSGC. We notice that the simulator can answer any queries, including O reveal and O corrupt .
2. When the simulated SSGC execution reaches the point of interest, the simulator asks the challenge SGC environment to establish an instance of SGC with the same set of users. The establishment of the instance is based on the rekeying event incurred by the adversary in SSGC, so that the legitimate users hold the corresponding keys as in SGC.Setup. This substitution can get through because the definition of strong-security ensures that the adversary in SSGC does not corrupt any legitimate user during the rekeying event.
3. At the next rekeying event, the simulator can continue its execution of the SSGC because it can utilize independent secrets that are freshly chosen by itself. We notice that the simulator can answer any queries, including O reveal and O corrupt , as it can simulate the SSGC environment in any future rekeying events.
Second, it is clear that the difference between SSGC and the aforementioned mental scheme is that the keys utilized in the rekeying events are either series of keys in the forms of f ki (1) where the k i 's are secret from the adversary, or freshly and independently chosen at random. We claim that the two cases are indistinguishable as long as the pseudorandom function family is secure. To see this, we notice that no adversary can, with a non-negligible probability, distinguish a single key-chain of a fixed key identity, namely
. . where k i is secret from the adversary, from a sequence of random secrets. Otherwise, we can construct an algorithm to distinguish a pseudorandom function from a random one with a non-negligible probability (because the number of rekeying events is polynomially-bounded). Conditioned on the fact that the number of keys is polynomially-bounded, we conclude that the keys derived from pseudorandom functions are indistinguishable from the keys that are freshly and independently chosen; otherwise, a standard hybrid argument shows that there exists an algorithm that is able to distinguish a pseudorandom function from a random one (because there are at most a polynomial number of key chains). 
Performance Optimization
In this section we show how to reduce the communication complexity in the SSGC; this might be very useful in applications such as MANETs and sensor networks. Suppose a Join event occurs at time t. The key observation includes:
1. In Join * of SSGC we could simply let the server sends the updated keys to the joining user U . We notice that, before U receiving the rekeying message from the server,
consists of a single key, denoted by k * , that is also known to the server. After sending the rekeying message, the server update
2. When the joining user U executes Rekey * corresponding to the Join * (i.e., after receiving the rekeying message), it lets f k * (0) plays the role of k * . Then, U updates k * to f k * (1) while keeping intact the other keys received from the server.
3. When an existing user V ∈ ∆ (t−1) executes Rekey * corresponding to the Join * , it simply updates every
(including the group key) to f ki (1).
The encryption of group communications is based on new group key k
We notice that the idea of substituting k i via a certain function was pointed out in [26, 8] with respect to the specific scheme of [28] . Here we show that it can actually be extended to accommodate the class of group communication schemes discussed in this paper. This justifies why we treat it as a possible feature of the compiler, which we call optimized compiler.
Theorem 4.2 Assume {f k } is a secure pseudorandom function family, and SGC is secure. If SGC does not adopt the afore-discussed performance optimization (otherwise, the optimized compiler does not gain anything over the original compiler), then the scheme output by the optimized compiler is also strongly-secure.
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, and thus omitted.
A Concrete Strongly-Secure Stateful Group Communication Scheme
In the last section we presented a compiler that can transform a certain secure stateful group communication scheme into a strongly-secure one. In this section we present a concrete strongly-secure stateful group communication scheme, which is obtained by applying the compiler to the WGL scheme [28] that is shown to be secure in Section 5.3. First we briefly review the WGL model.
The WGL Model
The WGL model is best known as a key tree, which outperforms the others (e.g., star key graph, or general key graph which actually leads to a certain NP-hard problem as we always need to minimize the communication complexity). A key tree T can be seen as a special class of directed acyclic graph with two types of nodes:
u-nodes representing users and k-nodes representing keys. Each u-node is a leaf that has one outgoing edge but no incoming edge, and each k-node is an inner node that has one or more incoming edges. Moreover, there is a k-node (i.e., the root) that has incoming edges but no outgoing edge.
Let U be a finite and nonempty set of users and K be a finite and nonempty set of keys. We are interested in a relation, R ⊆ U × K, that can be specified by a key tree T as follows:
• There is a one-to-one correspondence between U and the set of u-nodes in T .
• There is a one-to-one correspondence between K and the set of k-nodes in T .
• (u, k) ∈ R if and only if T has a directed path from the u-node that corresponds to a user u ∈ U to the k-node that corresponds to a key k ∈ K.
This means that the group key is at the root of the tree, which is shared by all the users in U . Since a key tree can be specified by two parameters -the height h of the tree is the length (in number of edges) of the longest directed path in the tree, and the degree d of the tree is the maximum number of incoming edges of a node in the tree -each user in U has at most h keys.
In order to clarify the presentation, we define two functions, keyset : U → K and userset : K → U , as follows:
Intuitively, keyset(u) is the set of keys held by user u ∈ U , and userset(k) is the set of users that hold key k ∈ K. Moreover, it is natural to generalize the definitions of keyset(u ∈ U ) to keyset(U ⊆ U ) = ∀ u∈U keyset(u), and of userset(k ∈ K) to userset(K ⊆ K) = ∀ k∈K userset(k).
A Strongly-Secure Stateful Group Communication Scheme
The new scheme is obtained by applying the compiler described in Section 4 to the WGL scheme based on the so-called group-oriented rekeying strategy, which is reviewed in Appendix A for completeness. (The WGL scheme can be based on the less efficient key-oriented and user-oriented strategies [28] . Nevertheless, it should be straightforward to adapt our scheme to these rekeying strategies.) The scheme consists of four protocols, namely SSGC = (Setup * , Join * , Leave * , Rekey * ).
The key server generates a key k i for each k-node. After the initialization, each user (corresponding to a u-node) holds the keys corresponding to the path from its parent k-node to the root. Join * : After granting a join request from user u, the key server s creates a new u-node for user u and a new k-node for its individual key k u . Then, server s finds an existing k-node (called the joining point for this join request) in the key tree and attaches the k-node k u to the joining point as its child. As a consequence, the keys corresponding to the path -starting at the joining point and ending at the root -need to be changed.
The algorithm is specified in Figure 4 , whose basic idea can be summarized as follows:
1. For each k-node x whose key needs to be changed, say, fromk i to freshly chosenk i , the server constructs two rekeying messages. The first rekeying message is the encryption of new keyk i with fk i (0), wherē k i is a non-root key that needs to be changed, and is sent to userset(k i ), namely the set of users that sharek i . The second rekeying message contains the encryption of the new keyk i with the individual key of the joining user, and is sent to the joining user. Moreover, these rekeying messages are appropriately grouped together.
2. Any other keyk j that needs not to be changed is replaced by fk j (1).
Join protocol for group-oriented rekeying: // suppose user u joins the group server s generates a new key k u for user u server s finds a joining point x j server s attaches k u to x j let x 0 be the root suppose x i−1 is the parent of
. . ,k j be the current keys of x 0 , . . . , x j , respectively server s generates fresh keysk 0 
Finally, k i is substituted with f ki (1) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 123, 456, 789}.
Leave * : After granting a leave request from user u, the key server s updates the key tree by deleting the u-node for user u and the k-node for its individual key from the key tree. The parent of the k-node corresponding to the user's individual key is called the leaving point. As a consequence, the keys corresponding to the path -starting at the leaving point and ending at the root -need to be changed. The algorithm is specified in Figure 5 , whose basic idea can be summarized as follows:
1. For each k-node x whose key needs to be changed, say, fromk i to freshly chosenk i , the server constructs a rekeying message that is the encryption ofk i with the keys of x's children in the new key tree. Note that "the keys of x's children in the new key tree" are either certain new keys that need to be distributed, or some current keys that need not to be changed (although they will be appropriately updated).
Leave protocol for group-oriented rekeying: // suppose u leaves the group let x j+1 be the deleted k-node for k ū k j+1 ← k u server s finds the leaving point x j (parent of k u ) server s removesk j+1 from the key tree let x 0 be the root suppose x i−1 is the parent of x i where 1 ≤ i ≤ j letk 0 ,k 1 , . . . ,k j be the keys of x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x j // they need to be changed server s generates fresh keysk 0 ,k 1 , . . . ,k j as the new keys of x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x j FOR i = 0 TO j − 1 letk i1 , . . . ,k iz i be the keys at the children of x i in the new key tree wherek ia is to be changed tok i+1 for some a ∈ {1,
. . ,k jz j be the keys at the children of x j in the new key tree Then, the group key is changed from k 1−9 to k 1−7,9 , and the key of leaving point is changed from k 789 to k 7, 9 in Figure 1 .(c). The rekeying message sent to the users is:
Finally, k i is updated to f ki (1) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 123, 456}, and k 7,9 is updated to f k7, 9 (1). In any case, a legitimate user u updates each k i ∈ keyset(u) to f ki (1), as long as k i is not changed to any key belonging to Θ, and erases the outdated keys.
Rekey
For example, corresponding to the event that u 9 joins the group as shown in Figure 1 .(a), u 1 obtains k 1−9 , updates k 123 to f k123 (1), and updates k 1 to f k1 (1). Whereas, u 9 obtains k 1−9 as well as k 789 , updates k 789 to f k789 (1), and updates k 9 to f k9 (1). Corresponding to the event that u 8 leaves the group as shown in Figure 1.(b) , u 1 obtains k 1−7,9 , updates k 123 to f k123 (1), and updates k 1 to f k1 (1). Whereas, u 9 obtains k 1−7,9 as well as k 7,9 , updates k 7,9 to f k7, 9 (1), and updates k 9 to f k9 (1).
Analysis
Theorem 5.1 Assume that the stand-alone encryptions utilized in the WGL encryption scheme are based on a secure pseudorandom function family. Then, the WGL scheme is secure.
Proof. (sketch) Consider a mental scheme that is the same as the WGL scheme, except that the encryptions corresponding to the rekeying event of interest -the event corresponding to the O T est (·, ·) query -are based on random functions. This substitution can get through because the definition of security requires that there are no corrupt users. We claim that this mental scheme is secure; otherwise, a standard hybrid argument shows that the pseudorandom function family is broken because the number of encryptions is polynomially-bounded (which is further based on the fact that the size of the key-tree is polynomiallybounded). Conditioned on the fact that there are a polynomially-bounded number of rekeying events, we conclude that the WGL scheme is secure. 2
As a corollary of Theorem 4.1 (which states that the compiler transforms a secure stateful group communication scheme to a strongly-secure one) and Theorem 5.1 (which states that the WGL scheme is indeed secure), we have:
The scheme presented in Section 5.2 is strongly-secure.
Performance Optimization
The improved scheme differs from SSGC only in Join * and Rekey * .
Improved Join * : This algorithm is specified in Figure 6 . It is the same as the Join * except the following:
(1) instead of freshly choosing new keys for the k-nodes on the path starting at a joining point and ending
at the root, we simply update every existing key k as f k (1), and (2) the new group key for encrypting actual group communications is f k (0), where k is the already updated key at the root.
Improved
Rekey * : It is the same as Rekey * except that when the rekeying is incurred by a join event: every existing user v holding a key set keyset(v) needs to update every k ∈ keyset(v) to f k (1), whereas the joining user u only needs to update its common key k u , which is established during the out-of-band approval Join protocol for group-oriented rekeying:
// suppose user u joins the group server s generates a new key k u for user u server s finds a joining point x j server s attaches k u to x j let x 0 be the root suppose x i−1 is the parent of x i for 1 ≤ i ≤ j letk 0 ,k 1 , . . . ,k j be the current keys of x 0 , . . . , x Figure 6 : Improved join-incurred group-oriented rekeying of the join request, to f ku (1). Note that the new group key for encrypting actual group communications is
, where k is the already updated key at the root.
For example, if u 9 joins the group configured as in Figure 1. (a), then u 9 is granted to join at the joining point of k-node k 78 . The key at the root is updated from k 1−8 to k 1−9 = f k1−8 (1) such that the new key for encrypting actual group communications is f k1−9 (0), and k 78 is updated to k 789 = f k78 (1). The sever sends the following messages:
Every existing user u i , i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, that holds a key set K i updates every k ∈ K i as f k (1). For example, u 7 updates k 1−8 to k 1−9 = f k1−8 (1), updates k 78 to k 789 = f k78 (1), and updates k 7 to k 7 = f k7 (1).
On the other hand, the joining user u 9 only needs to update k 9 to k 9 = f k9 (1), which means that it keeps
As a corollary of Theorem 4.2 (which states that the optimized compiler in Section 4.2 transforms a secure stateful group communication scheme into a strongly-secure one) and Theorem 5.1 (which states that the WGL scheme is indeed secure), we have
Corollary 5.2
The optimized scheme in Section 5.4 is strongly-secure.
The Case of Stateless Group Communication Schemes
Recall that we briefly reviewed the subset-cover framework [22] in Section 1.1. This section is organized as follows. In Section 6.1 we discuss the models and security definitions, including the notions of strong-security (i.e., backward-security in the active outsider attack model) and of security (i.e., forward-security in the passive attack model). In Section 6.2 we explore the relationships between the security notions. In Section 6.3 we present a compiler that can transform a subclass of secure stateless group communication schemes into strongly-secure ones, whose security is analyzed in Section 6.4. A concrete strongly-secure stateless group communication scheme, which is based on the complete subtree method [22] , is presented in Section 6.5. Some practical issues are discussed in Section 6.6.
Model and Security of Stateless Group Communication Schemes
The subset-cover framework of [22] was briefly reviewed in Fig. 2 . More specifically, let κ be a security parameter, N be the set of all users such that |N | = N is polynomially-bounded, and R ⊂ N be a group of |R| = r users whose decryption privileges should be revoked. Let E L be a symmetric key cryptosystem secure against an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack, and F K be a symmetric key cryptosystem with a weaker security property (i.e., indistinguishability under a single chosen-plaintext attack). In what follows, by "A corrupts a user u" we mean that not only the internal state of u (including I u ) is given to A, but also u will behave according to A (i.e., Byzantine); by "u is revoked" we mean that u is not entitled to receive the message with respect to the specified session(s). For simplicity, we assume that a user, once corrupt, is always corrupt.
Stateless group communication schemes are indeed simpler than stateful ones because (1) both the joining and leaving operations are implicit -the rekeying messages are coupled with the payload, and (2) when a user (re-)joins a group, its long-term keys can indeed be reused. Therefore, the model of stateless group communication schemes can also be correspondingly simplified. In particular, we assume the center keeps an incremental counter for each broadcast messages so that the encryptions may be simply denoted by
, . . . and the corresponding plaintext messages may be denoted by M (1) , M (2) , . . .. One may think each C (i) corresponds to an "rekeying" event with revocation set
We assume that during the system initialization the center can communicate with each legitimate user through an authenticated private channel. In practice, the authenticated private channel can be implemented by a two-party authenticated key-exchange protocol, which should also ensure, as in the case of stateful group communication schemes, that certain relevant keys are securely erased after the initialization. Further, we assume that after the system initialization the center can communicate with any users through an authenticated channel. For simplicity, we also assume (loose) clock synchronization between the center and the users. 
Definition 6.2 (passive attack model) In this adversarial model, the adversary A is not allowed to corrupt any other legitimate member. In other words, the adversary is only allowed to decide when it is to be revoked (in an arbitrary fashion though). Formally, A cannot corrupt any u ∈ N \ {A}
In each of the two models, we define two security notions: backward-security and forward-security.
That is, we have four security notions: backward-security in the active outsider attack model or simply strong-security for short, forward-security in the active outsider attack model or simply security for short, backward-security in the passive attack model, and forward-security in the active outsider attack model. We may call this the "challenge" message. It is trivial to see that strong-security implies backward-security in the passive model, and that security implies forward-secure in the passive attack model.
For
i = 1 +2, 1 +3, . .
., the following restrictions apply. (1) Even if A ∈ N , A can only decide whether
A ∈ R (i) . (2) Even if R (i) \ {A} = ∅,
The Relationships between the Security Notions
We summarize the relationships between the security notions of stateless group communication schemes in Proof. The fact that security does not imply strong-security is implied by (1) Theorem 6.3, which states that the complete subtree method of the subset-cover framework is secure, and (2) that the subset-cover framework is insecure against an active outsider attacker (cf. the attack scenario in Section 1.1). The key observation is indeed that the adversary's capability in the strong-security is strictly stronger. 2
The above proposition implies that for a stateless group communication scheme, one only needs to show that it is strongly-secure. We do not know whether forward-security in the passive attack mode also implies forward-security in the active outsider attack model. The relationship may seem trivial at a first glance, since all the corrupt members are revoked before the "challenge" session, and the adversary is not allowed to corrupt any member after the "challenge" session. Although it can indeed be showed that the implication holds, provided that the adversary is static meaning that the adversary decides which principals in N it will corrupt. In the more interesting case that the adversary is adaptive, we do not know how to prove it. Proof. Theorem 6.3 shows that the complete subtree revocation scheme in the subset-cover framework is secure (i.e., forward-secure in the active outsider attack model), which trivially means that it is also forward-secure in the passive attack model. Then, Proposition 6.3 shows that it is also backward-secure in the passive attack model.
On the other hand, the attack scenario showed in Section 1.1 states that the subset-cover framework is not backward-secure in the active outsider attack model. 2
A Compiler for Stateless Group Communication Schemes
Now we present a compiler that can transform a subclass of secure stateless group communication schemes falling into the subset-cover framework (called the input schemes) into strongly-secure ones. The subclass of stateless group communication schemes has the characteristics that the different keys belonging to {L i } i ∪ {I u } u are computationally independent of each other. Let {f k } be a pseudorandom function family. The compiler is specified in Fig. 8 .
Initialization: This is the same as in the input scheme.
Broadcasting: Given a set R (which may be empty at the first broadcasting after initialization), the center executes the following: Proof. Consider a mental game in which the system is initialized as in the input scheme. However, with respect to each broadcast operation, each incorrupt L i is substituted with a pair of independently chosen random keys L
where a = 1, 2, . . .. We claim that this scheme is secure. This is because the keys that are used to encrypt the session key are freshly and independently chosen at random, which means that it is essentially a "short-lived" version of the input scheme. We also claim that this scheme is strongly-secure. This is because the keys that are used to encrypt the message-encryption key are freshly and independently chosen at random, which means that the secrets compromised after the "challenge" message are information-theoretically independent of the the secrets used to encrypt the session key in the "challenge" message. Therefore, this scheme is strongly-secure.
Suppose the scheme output by the compiler (called real-life scheme) is not strongly-secure. We observe that the difference between the above mental game and the real-life scheme is "how the incorrupt keys are evolved." Specifically, for a > 0, in the former case, the L
are independently chosen at random; in the latter case, L
Now we consider the following experiment EXPT j , where 0 ≤ j ≤ and is the total number of revocation operations (which is polynomially bounded). The experiment is initialized as in the above mental game or the real-life scheme (both are the same at this stage). For any 0 ≤ a ≤ j, any incorrupt
(1) . The experiments can get through because the secrets (some of them are used for encrypting the message-encryption key) are (at least) computationally independent of each other. We observe that EXPT 0 corresponds to the real-life scheme, and EXPT corresponds to the above mental scheme. Since we assumed that EXPT 0 is not strongly-secure, it holds that A has a non-negligible success probability ε 0 with respect to Definition 6.3. On the other hand, we already know that EXPT is strongly-secure, which means that A has only a negligible success probability ε . Since is polynomially bounded, there must exist 0 ≤ j < such that EXPT j and EXPT j+1 are distinguishable with a non-negligible probability (by the means of the adversary A that may or may not break the strong-security in the respective experiments). Suppose f is a challenge oracle that is either a random function or a pseudorandom function with equal probability. Then, we can distinguish a random function from a pseudorandom one, via black-box access to f, with a non-negligible probability by letting L 
A Concrete strongly-secure Stateless Group Communication Scheme
Within the subset-cover revocation framework, [22] presented two concrete algorithms, namely the complete subtree method and the subset difference method. The difference between the two methods is how the collection of subsets (covering N \ R) is selected. Now we briefly review the complete subtree method, to which the above compiler is applicable.
Suppose the receivers are the leaves in a rooted full binary tree with N leaves (assume that N is a power of 2). Such a tree contains 2N − 1 nodes (leaves plus internal nodes) and for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N − 1 we assume that v i is a node in the tree. Denote by ST (R) the unique (directed) Steiner Tree induced by the set R or vertices and the root; i.e., the minimal subtree of the full binary tree that connects all the leaves in R. The collection of subsets S 1 , . . . , S w in this scheme corresponds to all complete subtrees in the full binary tree.
For any node v i in the full binary tree (either an internal node or a leaf, 2N − 1 altogether) let subset S i be the collection of receivers u that correspond to the leaves of the subtree rooted at node v i . In other words, u ∈ S i iff v i is an ancestor of u.
The initialization algorithm is simple: assign an independent and random key L i to every node v i in the complete tree, and provide every receiver u with the log N + 1 keys associated with the nodes along the path from the root to leaf u. (As said before, if the secret information I u is transmitted using a key established via a two-party authenticated key-exchange protocol, then the key is securely erased after the initialization.)
The broadcasting algorithm is as follows. For a given se R of revoked receivers, let u 1 , . . . , u r be the leaves corresponding to the elements in R. The method to partition N \ R into disjoint subsets is as follows. Let Note that the number of subsets in a cover with N users and r revocations is at most r log N r . The message length is of at most r log N r keys. Each receiver stores log N keys, and the center stores 2N − 1 keys. The decryption process incurs O(log log N ) comparison operations (for finding the cover) plus two decryption operations.
Theorem 6.3 ([22])
The complete subtree revocation scheme of the subset-cover framework is secure.
As showed before, the subset-cover framework, and thus the complete subtree revocation scheme, is not strongly secure. As a corollary of Theorem 6.2 (which states that the compiler in Section 6.3 can transforms a secure stateless group communication scheme into a strongly-secure one) and Theorem 6.3 (which states that the above complete subtree method is a secure stateless group communication scheme), the scheme output by the compiler is strongly-secure. Now we analyze the extra complexities (corresponding to each revocation event) for achieving strong-security.
• The center updates its keys by evaluating 2N − 1 pseudorandom functions (this corresponds to the worst case scenario that no keys have been corrupt -the corrupt keys, if known, do not need to be updated). Moreover, in order to encrypt a message, the center needs to evaluate r log N r pseudorandom functions; this computational complexity can indeed be traded with an extra 2N −1 storage complexity.
Since the center is typically powerful in terms of computation, communication, and storage, these extra complexities are insignificant.
• Each receiver needs to evaluate 2 log N pseudorandom functions and at most stores log N keys. Even if the receivers are low-end equipments (e.g., sensors), these extra complexities should still be insignificant.
Discussions
The class of the stateless group communication schemes that can be made strongly-secure via the compiler in Section 6.3 should possess the following property: all the different keys belonging to {L i } i ∪ {I u } u are computationally-independent of each other. This explains why the above compiler applies to the complete subtree method of [22] . On the other hand, the subset difference method of [22] , which does not achieve the desired strong-security, cannot made strongly-secure via the above compiler because the keys belonging to {L i } i ∪ {I u } u are not computationally independent. 4 The stateless group communication schemes presented in [12] , which outperforms [22, 11] under certain interesting circumstances, are not strongly-secure. Unfortunately, they cannot be made strongly-secure via the above compiler for a similar reason. It is an interesting open question to make the stateless group communication schemes of [12] strongly-secure at an expense similar to the extra complexity imposed by the compilers presented in this paper.
Conclusion and Open Problems
We showed that a class of existing group communication schemes, stateful and stateless alike, are vulnerable to a realistic severe attack. We presented formal models that allow us to capture the desired security properties, and explore the relationships between the security notions. We showed how some methods can make a subclass of existing schemes immune to the attack at a very small extra cost. An interesting open question is to make other schemes (e.g., the stateful [25, 2] and the stateless [12] ) secure against the attack without imposing any significant extra complexity.
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